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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TO RESOLVE DISPUTES
UNDER NAVTA CHAPTER 11: INVESTMENT
S. Benton Canteyf
I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 11 of The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
provides rules for foreign investment and investment disputes between the
United States, Canada and Mexico' This chapter "has three objectives:
establish a secure investment environment through the elaboration of clear
rules of fair treatment of foreign investing and investors; remove barriers
to investment by eliminating or liberalizing existing restrictions; and
provide an effective means for the resolution of disputes between an
investor and the host government."2 The dispute resolution framework
provides NAFTA investors the ability to request pecuniary damages
through international arbitration instead of seeking alternative remedies
through the host government's courts or tribunals.' Chapter 11 is laid out
according to those objectives. 4 Chapter 11 is divided into two primary
sections, section A and section B.
Section A "provides four basic protections to 'investors of other
parties': non discriminatory treatment; freedom from 'performance
J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma, May 2002; M.B.A., Texas
Tech University, The Jerry S. Rawls College of Business Administration, Lubbock, Texas,
1999; B.A., Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, 1998.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, art, 11, 38 I.L.M. 88
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules
and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727 (1993).
3. Richard C. Levin & Susan Erickson Marim, NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment and
Investment Disputes, 2 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 82 (1996).
4. Price, supra note 2, at 727.
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requirements;' free transfer of funds related to an investment; and
expropriation only in conformity with international law."5 Further, Section
A includes provisions where the host government may not control senior
management, may deny NAFTA benefits, may maintain environmental
protections, and may provide exceptions to the general rules. "Section B of
Chapter 11 provides a mechanism for an investor to pursue a claim against
a host government that it has breached its obligations under Section A."6
This comment is intended to provide investors with a clear
understanding of the core provisions of Chapter 11. Additionally, the
comment will convey the rules of international arbitration under NAFTA,
as well as provide the investor with insight as to the practical workings of
this procedure from the relatively few cases that have been arbitrated
under Chapter 11. Part II will discuss and provide investors with an outline
of the significant parts of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Part III will furnish the
reader with a clear understanding of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In Part IV, the handful of
cases that have been decided or are pending under the Centre will be
discussed, as well as the potential ramifications of those decisions. Next,
Part V will provide a look at the results of expropriation for compensation.
This portion of the comment will focus on possible alternatives and
arguments for narrowing the scope of the expropriation provision under
NAFTA Chapter 11. Finally, Part VI concludes with an overview of the
pertinent NAFTA provisions for future potential international investors




It is first necessary to define the terms "investor" and "investment."7
An "'investor of a party' is defined to encompass both firms (including
branches) established in a NAFTA country, without distinction as to the
nationality of ownership, and NAFTA-country nationals.",8 The term
investment is defined very broadly in Article 1139, which includes both
future and existing investments.9 Moreover, "investment" includes
5. The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act: Chapter Eleven:
Investment, 1993 WL 561159, at 1 [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation Act].
6. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 5.
7. Price, supra note 2, at 728,
8. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 1.
9. Id.
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"ownership and other interests in an enterprise, such as equity or debt
securities of an enterprise as well as certain loans to an enterprise." ' Other
interests such as "interests that entitle an owner to share in the income or
profits of an enterprise; real estate; and all forms of tangible and intangible
property, including intellectual property" are all included under the
investment definition." The investment definition "also extends to
interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources such as
under concession agreements; turnkey or construction contracts; or
contracts where the remuneration depends on the production, revenues, or
profits of an enterprise such as may occur under license or franchise
agreements."'"
1. Non-Discriminatory Treatment
NAFTA governments are required to treat NAFTA investors and
their investments "no less favorably than its own investors and their
investments, and no less favorably than investors of other countries and
their investments."'13 This treatment applies "to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other
disposition of investments., 14 A host government may not impose local
equity requirements or require an investor from another NAFTA country,
by reason of its nationality, to sell an investment according to Article
1102.5 Further, Article 1102(3) calls for an investor to receive "treatment
no less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded, in like
circumstances, by that state or province to investors.., of the Party of
which it forms a part."' 6 Thus, a major reason this provision was
incorporated was to encourage international investing. In addition, this
provision was intended to increase the confidence of international
investors, allowing them not to worry about losing their investment capital
under international uncertainty.
2. Performance Requirements
According to Article 1106, a government may not require a firm to
"export a certain percentage of output; give preferences for domestic
sourcing; achieve a certain level of domestic content; transfer technology;
10. Price, supra note 2, at 728.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 1.
14. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1102(1).
15. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 1.
16. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1102(3).
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or achieve a certain trade balance by restricting domestic sales to some
proportion of exports or foreign exchange earnings." 7 All NAFTA host
governments are required to abide by the rules that prohibit performance
requirements "whether by non-NAFKFA investors, domestic investors, or
investors from another NAFTA country."'"
Preventing performance requirements serves two goals." First, "trade
distortions that arise from the imposition of performance requirements"
are eliminated.20 Consequently, a host country is prevented from placing a
performance requirement on its own investors." Second, investors'
decisions are based solely on their own judgment rather than being
clouded by interests of the host government 2 Yet, it is important to note
that "performance requirements do not affect a government's ability to
apply nondiscriminatory environmental measures.
23
3. Managerial Regulation
NAFTA governments shall not require that senior management
positions be filled with local nationals.24 In spite of this, the host
government may require the majority of the board of directors to consist
of local nationals as long as this does not "materially impair the ability of
the investor to exercise control over its investment." 2' Based on the face of
this provision, it seems that host government interference has been
eliminated. Nevertheless, skepticism remains that political persuasion has
been removed because of host governments' ability to put local nationals
on the board of directors.
4. Transfers
Each NAFTA government must permit transfers relating to an
investment to be made "freely and without delay."2 "This includes
transfers to the investor such as the remittance of profits and dividends,
the payment of interest and principal under a loan agreement, royalty
payments, management fees, and proceeds from sale or liquidation of an
17. Price, supra note 2, at 729.
18. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 2.




23. NAFIA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 2.
24. Id. art. 1107(1).
25. Id. art. 1107(2).
26. Id. art. 1109(1).
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investment."27  Still, there are exceptions under Article 1109, and a
government is also protected because the government "may prevent a
transfer through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith
application of its laws" regarding such issues as bankruptcy and criminal
offenses. Once again, on its face this appears to be a favorable provision
for international investors. However, one must be aware that with the
ability to prevent a transfer, foreign host governments have the
opportunity to construe some actions as criminal, which might not be
criminal otherwise, in order to prevent a transfer of money.
5. Expropriation and Compensation
A NAFTA government "may not expropriate an investment made by
an investor from other NAFTA countries other than for a public purpose,
on a non-discriminatory basis and in accordance with due process of law."'2 9
Article 1110 "covers direct, indirect and so-called 'creeping'
expropriation. "3' "Compensation must be paid without delay, be equal to
the fair market value of the investment, include interest from the date of
expropriation, and be fully realizable and freely transferable as provided in
the transfers article."31 According to Article 1110 (2), "[v]aluation criteria
shall include going concern value, asset value including declared tax value
of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair
market value. 32 Article 1110 "does not attempt to articulate the line
between a legitimate regulation and a compensation taking. 3 3 The
"[aigreement between Mexico and the United States on the expropriation
article effectively ends a difference that has persisted for decades on what
compensation is due in the event of an expropriation." 34 Foreign
governments should be weary of this provision.3" The language in the
expropriation provision is broad.3' Formerly impervious to lawsuits from
foreign investors, this provision creates an avenue for foreign investors to
file a lawsuit against a host government over any regulation they might
37
make that impairs investor's property interests. Accordingly, a
27. Price, supra note 2, at 729.
28. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1109(4).
29. NAFT7A Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 4.
30. Price, supra note 2, at 730.
31. Id.
32. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(2).
33. Price, supra note 2, at 730.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(2).
37. Price, supra note 2, at 730.
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government should be worried about being sued for expropriation every
time it promulgates .a regulation which curtails a foreign investor's
business.38 Moreover, rather than being worried just about the lawsuit, the
compensation remedy for expropriation is extremely significant. 9
6. Denial of Benefits
"Article 1113 describes those circumstances under which a NAFTA
government may refuse to apply the protection of Chapter 11 to firms, or
their investments, that otherwise qualify for coverage under the chapter,
where firms are owned or controlled by investors from a non-NAFTA
country. ' ' 40 Further, each government may deny benefits to a firm owned
or controlled by investors to which it is applying economic sanctions.4'
Shell companies could be denied benefits if they have no substantial
business activities in the NAFTA country where they are established.42 On
the other hand, these shell companies cannot be denied benefits if they
"maintain their central administration or principal place of business in the
territory of, or have a real and continuous link with, the country where
they are established., 43 However, "this provision requires the denying
government to give prior notification, and to consult, in accordance with
Articles 1803 and 2006." 4
7. Environmental Protections
Article 1114 provides two main environmental protections for
NAFTA host countries. 45 The article indicates that "[n]othing in this
Chapter shall be construed to prevent a party from adopting, maintaining
or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns." 46 Further,
paragraph two states, "[t]he parties recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental
measures." 47 "Derogations from this provision are subject to compulsory
consultations if requested by a NAFTA government but are not subject to
38. Id.
39. Id.





45. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(1)(2).
46. Id.
47. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114(2).
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formal dispute settlement under Chapter 20." 48 Although this provision is
included in NAFTA, it has not delayed investors from suing over
environmental regulations that have affected their businesses.
B. Section B
Section B sets out rules of settlement disputes between a host
government and an investor of another party. It "establishes a mechanism
for the settlement of investment disputes that assures both equal treatment
among investors of the parties in accordance with the principal of
international reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal.,
49
"This mechanism is patterned after the investor-State dispute settlement
mechanism of the standard U.S. bilateral investment treaty and permits an
investor to submit its claim to binding arbitration under internationally-
accepted rules.,
50
1. Statute of Limitations
"An investor may not make a claim if more than three years have
elapsed from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should have
first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the
investor has incurred loss or damage.""1 Similar to statutes of limitations in
the United States, this provision creates the propensity for significant
argument about when an investor should have first acquired knowledge of
the breach.52 Moreover, since the inherent nature of a NAFTA investment
is a "foreign" investment, the likelihood that an investor maintains a
hands-off approach to foreign investment creates even more uncertainty
about the ability of a defendant government in proving when the hands-off
investor, if such is the case, acquired or should have acquired knowledge of
the breach.5 3 Thus, a hands-off investor seems to have a bit of an advantage
in surviving the statute of limitations here, whereas a host government is at
a bit of a disadvantage.54
2. Types of Claims Allowed to be Submitted to Arbitration
There are two main categories of injury that may be submitted to
arbitration: "allegations of direct injury to an investor, and allegations of
48. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 5.
49. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1115.
50. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 5.
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indirect injury to an investor caused by injury to a firm in the host country
that is owned or controlled by the investor."55 In both instances, "investors
may bring claims where the injury results from an alleged breach of
Section A or of certain provisions governing the behavior of government
monopolies in Chapter Fifteen."56 "The investor-state arbitration
provisions extend, subject to explicit reservations set out in NAFTA, to (1)
actions taken by federal, state and provincial governments; (2) certain
actions taken by state enterprises; and (3) actions taken by certain state-
chartered monopolies when the actions are inconsistent with the
NAFT A.
5 7
Arbitration is viewed in the United States as a form of alternative
dispute resolution, but under NAFTA Chapter 11, arbitration is the
adjudication of a claim. Nevertheless, Chapter 11 would be unclothed
without a provision recommending alternative dispute resolution before
commencing a binding arbitration. 9 Hence, Article 1118 provides "[t]he
disputing parties should first attempt to settle a claim through consultation
or negotiation. '""o
3. Arbitration Process
Pursuant to Article 1119, a "disputing investor shall deliver to the
disputing Party written notice of its intention to submit a claim to
arbitration at least 90 days before the claim is submitted., 6' Similarly, for a
complaint filed in the United States, the written notice must specify such
items as the disputant's address, where the claim is being made, issues and
62factual basis of the claim, and relief sought. Then again, a claim may not
be submitted to arbitration until six months have passed since the events
that gave rise to the claim."
Once all of these conditions are met, an investor may submit a claim
to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes if
the investor and host country are parties to the ICSID Convention. 64 If
only the investor or the government is a party to the Convention but not
both, the claim may be brought under the Additional Facility Rules of the
55. NAFFA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 1.
56. Id.
57. Price, supra note 2, at 732.
58. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1115.
59. Id. art. 1118.
60. Id.
61. Id. art. 1119.
62. Id. art. 1119 (a)-(d).
63. Id. art. 1120(1).
64. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 6.
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ICSID 65 or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. 66 "At present, only the United States is
party to the ICSID Convention. Therefore, only U.S. investors, or claims
against the United States, may be heard under the Additional Facility
Rules., 67 Article 1121, however, "requires the investor.., to consent in
writing to arbitration, and to waive the right to initiate or continue any
actions in local courts or other fora relating to the disputed measure,
except actions for injunctive or other extraordinary relief." S
Although waiving a right to initiate actions in other forums may sound
rather insignificant, it can cause a claim to be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction with the Arbitral panel.69 This was indeed the case in Waste
Management Inc. v. United Mexican States.70 In Waste Management, Waste
Management, Inc. filed a notice of intent to arbitrate with the ICSID on an
action against the government of the United Mexican States.1 Waste
Management, Inc. sought
compensation by way of damages for an alleged breach on the part of
the state-owned entities, BANCO NACIONAL DE OBRAS Y
SERVICIOS PUBLICOS, S.N.C. (hereinafter referred to as
BANOBRAS), the MEXICAN STATE OF GUERRERO (hereinafter
referred to as GUERRERO), AND THE CITY COUNCIL OF
ACAPULCO DE JUAREZ (hereinafter referred to as ACAPULCO)
of obligations laid down by Articles 1105 and 1110 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),2
Pursuant to Article 1121, the claimant must waive their right to pursue
the same action in any other forum.73 Waste Management filed the
following waiver:
Additionally, Claimants hereby waive their right to initiate or continue
before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any
65. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1120(1)(b).
66. Id. art. 1120(1)(c).
67. Price, supra note 2, at 732. See discussion infra Part III.
68. NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 5, at 6.
69. Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States ARB(AF)/9812, ICSID (June 2,
2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/waste-award.pdf.
70. Id. § 1.
71. Id.
72. id.
73. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121(2)(b).
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NAFTA Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings
with respect to the measures taken by Respondent that are alleged to be
a breach of NAFTA Chapter Eleven and applicable rules of
international law, except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory, or
other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages. This
waiver does not apply, however, to any dispute settlement proceedings
involving allegations that Respondent has violated duties imposed byS 74
other sources of law, including the municipal law of Mexico.
Disenchanted with this waiver, specifically the highlighted exclusion,
counsel for the United Mexican States requested Waste Management
confirm that the waiver did not deviate from the waiver required by
Article 1121. 75 In response, Waste Management sent the same waiver
clause mentioned above except for the addition of the following language:
Without derogating from the waiver required by NAFTA Article 1121,
Claimants here set forth their understanding that the above waiver does
not apply to any dispute settlement proceedings involving allegations
that Respondent has violated duties imposed by sources of law other
than Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, including the municipal law of
Mexico. 76
Still concerned with this waiver provision, the legal advisor for the
ICSID sent a letter to Waste Management seeking confirmation that the
waiver
tendered was applicable to any such dispute settlement proceedings in
Mexico as might involve allegations of breaches of any obligations,
imposed by other sources of law, which in substance were not different
from those of the Party State under NAFTA Chapter XI, except for
proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not
77involving the payment of damages.
Waste Management responded with the following answer to the
ICSID's inquiry:
74. Waste Management Inc., supra note 69, § 4.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 5.
77. Id.
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With respect to the inclusion in the Notice of Institution, of the waiver
required by NAFTA Article 1121 and USA Waste's understanding of
the scope of that required waiver, USA Waste hereby confirms that the
waiver contained in the Notice of Institution applies to dispute
settlement proceedings in Mexico involving allegations of breaches of
any obligations, imposed by other sources of law, that are not different
in substance from the obligations of a NAFTA State Party under
Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA, except for proceedings for injunctive,
declaratory, or other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of
damages. With respect to USA Waste's efforts to resolve its dispute
with Mexico outside of the remedies offered by NAFTA, there are no
pending legal proceedings related to that dispute in which the
78Government of the United Mexican States is a named party.
The Government of Mexico vehemently disagreed that this waiver
and confirmation was within the terms laid out in Article 1121. 79 The
Government of Mexico evidenced this assertion with proof that there were
current proceedings being brought against BANOBRAS and
ACAPULCO.80 Finally, in November of 1996, the Government of Mexico
submitted a question of jurisdiction to ICSID alleging that Waste
Management had not given the proper waiver in accordance with Article
1121.81
Most noteworthy for international investors, the Arbitral Tribunal
held that a waiver was a unilateral act under NAFTA Article 1121.12 The
tribunal stated that the waiver "implies a voluntary abdication of rights,
inasmuch as this act generally leads to substantial modification of the pre-
existing legal situation, namely, the forfeiting or extinguishment of the
right."8 3 The panel went on to state that "[w]hatever the case, any waiver
must be clear, explicit and categorical, it being improper to deduce same
from expressions the meaning of which is at all dubious."84 Further, the
panel indicated that the conduct of the party asserting the waiver must be
reviewed to see if there is a difference between sentiments manifested and
7& Id.
79. Id. § 6.
80. Waste Management Inc., supra note 69, § 6.
81. Id.
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the actual conduct . This means that the panel investigated the separate
actions being brought against BANOBRAS and ACAPULCO to decide if
they were different from the allegations brought under Chapter 11.86 The
tribunal recognized that in the other two suits brought under Mexican law
rather than NAFTA, those actions could be held separate from NAFTA.87
Nevertheless, those actions could also be derived from the same measures
as the NAFTA lawsuit.8 When this is the case, a NAFTA cause of action
and a separate but derivative claim may not co-exist.8 9 If this were not the
case, the claimant would be entitled to double benefits in its claim for
damages.90
In deeming the waiver submitted by Waste Management invalid, the
panel stated that Waste Management "did not limit itself to a full
transcription of the content of this Article." 91 Instead, the tribunal found
that Waste Management "introduced a series of statements that reflected
its own understanding of the waiver submitted, as is evident from the
findings of fact outlined in this arbitral award now issued hereunder.',1
2
The panel went on to state that Waste Management "systematically failed
to comply with the actual agreement that the waiver of Article 1121
requires." 93 Further, Waste Management did not intend to present "the
waiver within the terms prescribed in NAFTA Article 1121, rather, it had
the intention to present it in accordance with its own interests."
94
Since the Arbitral Tribunal found the waiver submitted by Waste
Management was invalid,95 and the waiver was a condition precedent of
arbitration under the ICSID, the ICSID was without jurisdiction to decide
the claims brought by Waste Management.9 6 The tribunal found no bad
faith on the part of Waste Management so both parties were responsible
for their own legal fees.7 However, Waste Management had to bear the
expense of this arbitral proceeding. 9'
85. Waste Management Inc., supra note 69, § 24.











97. Waste Management Inc., supra note 69, § 31.
98. Id.
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This was an expensive lesson learned by Waste Management.
However, this case serves as a caution for future foreign investors and
states who wish to try to circumvent the waiver required by NAFTA
Article 1121.
III. WHO IS THE ICSID?
The ICSID is a product of the World Bank. "On a number of
occasions in the past, the World Bank as an institution and the President of
the Bank in his personal capacity have assisted in mediation or conciliation
of investment disputes between governments and private foreign
investors." 99 The rise of the ICSID in 1966 was partly meant to alleviate
the World Bank President and his staff of the aggravation of becoming
involved in these disputes.' "But the Bank's overriding consideration in
creating ICSID was the belief that an institution specially designed to
facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between governments and
foreign investors could help to promote increased flows of international
investment."''"
"Established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States in 1966, the ICSID
has an Administrative Council and a Secretariat.' 0. 2 Headed by the World
Bank's President, the Administrative Council has one representative of
each state that has ratified the convention."3 "Annual meetings of the
council are held in conjunction with the joint Bank/Fund annual
meetings."l04
Even though the ICSID is a self-governing international organization,
it has close connections with the World Bank.' 5 "All of the ICSID's
members are also members of the Bank."'06 "Unless a government makes
a contrary designation, its Governor for the Bank sits ex officio on ICSID's
Administrative Council."'07 "The expenses of the ICSID Secretariat are
99. The World Bank Group, About ICSID, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/
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financed out of the Bank's budget, although the costs of individual
proceedings are borne by the parties involved."'8
"Pursuant to the Convention, ICSID provides facilities for the
conciliation and arbitration of disputes between member countries and
investors who qualify as nationals of other member countries."'0'9 ICSID
conciliation and arbitration are completely voluntary."0 Once parties have
agreed to arbitrate under the ICSID Convention, neither party may
withdraw its consent without the consent of the other."' In addition, all
countries that are members of the ICSID, regardless if they are parties to
the dispute, must validate and require compliance with ICSID arbitral
awards."
2
Other than supplying facilities for conciliation and arbitration, since
1978 the Centre has had a set of Additional Facility Rules empowering the
ICSID Secretariat to manage specific types of proceedings between foreign
nationals and states that fall outside the realm of the Convention.I" "These
include conciliation and arbitration proceedings where either the State
party or the home State of the foreign national is not a member of the
ICSID. ' '114 "Additional facility conciliation and arbitration are also
available for cases where the dispute is not an investment dispute provided
it relates to a transaction which has 'features that distinguishes it from an
ordinary commercial transaction.' 1 1 5 Moreover, the Additional Facility
Rules allow the ICSID to conduct certain proceedings not covered in the
convention, "namely fact-finding proceedings to which any State and
foreign national may have recourse if they wish to institute an inquiry 'to
examine and report on facts.'1
6
The ICSID also performs another activity. "A third activity of the
ICSID in the field of settlement of disputes has consisted in the Secretary-
General of the ICSID accepting to act as the appointing authority of
arbitrators for ad hoc (i.e., non-institutional) arbitration proceedings."' 17










117. The World Bank Group, supra note 99.
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arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of UNCITRAL, which are
specially designed for ad hoc proceedings.""'
Certain areas on ICSID arbitration are prevalently seen in
"investment contracts between governments of member countries and
investors from other member countries."'1 9 Prior approval by governments
to settle investment disputes by ICSID arbitration is commonly seen in
"about twenty investment laws and in over 900 bilateral investment
treaties."'20 "Arbitration under the auspices of ICSID is one of the main
mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes under four recent
multilateral trade and investment treaties including, NAFTA, the Energy
Charter Treaty, the Cartagena Free Trade Agreement and the Colonia
Investment Protocol of Mercosur.','
ICSID proceedings do not have to be held in Washington D.C., the
Centre's headquarters, pursuant to the ICSID Convention.12 Any other
venue that is acceptable to both parties is acceptable to the ICSID.'23 "The
ICSID Convention contains provisions that facilitate advance stipulations
for such other venues when the place chosen is the seat of an institution
with which the Centre has an arrangement for this purpose.' 2, 4 Up to the
present time, the ICSID has used other venues such as the "Permanent
Court of Arbitration at the Hague, the Regional Arbitration Centre of the
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee ... the Australian Centre
for International Commercial Arbitration at Melbourne, the Australian
Commercial Disputes Centre at Sydney, the Singapore International
Arbitration Centre and the GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre at
Bahrain.',15 Several of these arrangements have validated their usefulness
in many instances. Not only have they settled disputes, but they have also
"helped to promote cooperation between ICSID and these institutions in
several other respects.
1 26
The ICSID has experienced a significant augmentation in the amount
of cases submitted to the Centre in recent years."' "These include cases
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Additional Facility Rules."12 8 "The ICSID also carries out advisory and
research activities relevant to its objectives and has a number of
publications."'' 29 The Centre works with other World Bank group units in
filling "requests by governments for advice on investment and arbitration
law."'3 "The publications of the Centre include multi-volume collections
of Investment Laws of the World and of Investment Treaties, which are
periodically updated by the ICSID staff." 131 "Since April 1986, the Centre
has published a semi-annual law journal entitled ICSID Review-Foreign
Investment Law Journal.', 3 2 Recently, the journal was rated as one of the
top twenty international and comparative law journals in the United
States. 33 "Since 1983, the Centre has also co-sponsored, with the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) International Court of Arbitration, colloquia on topics
of current interest in the area of international arbitration.'
'13 4
IV. CASES
A. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States
Metalclad is a Newport Beach, California waste disposal company,
which adds insulation to pipes, ducts, furnaces, boilers, and other industrial
equipment and includes maintenance, repair and removal. The company,
primarily a West Coast operation, also provides asbestos abatement
services."' Metalclad filed a complaint with the ICSID in January of 1997
alleging that the Mexican State of San Luis Potosi transgressed several
NAFFA provisions when the state prevented a Metalclad subsidiary,
Quimica Omega de Mexico, from commencing the operation of its waste
disposal plant.'37 The facility was taken over by Metalclad on the condition
128. Id.
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that it would cleanup preexisting contaminants. 13 The plant had a history
of contaminating local ground water.13 9
NAFTA only allows Metalclad to file suit against Mexico's federal
government . 4 Regardless, the federal Environmental Ministry claims that
it was not involved "in designating the ecological zone because such
activities fall under state government jurisdiction.' 141 "According to Clyde
Pearce, a lawyer for Metalclad, the defense is 'claiming that it followed
some normal procedures' in canceling the project.', 4 2 He also stated that
"even if it did, that doesn't matter because those procedures violate the
guarantees of NAFTA.'
143
Metalclad chief executive officer Grant Kesler feels that Mexico could
suffer, if Metalclad should lose the case. Kesler stated, "[i]f we get
screwed, who else is going to take the risk of going down there?" Kesler
is confident that Metalclad would be able to collect on any award by the
tribunal because "we have the right to attach Mexican assets in the
United States, which would include their account at the World Bank.
There is no way to avoid paying a NAFTA award." This whole dispute
could have been avoided, according to Mr. Kesler, except for the actions
of "a single Mexican governor." '44
There are only two other hazardous waste facilities in Mexico for a country
that generates more than eight million tons of hazardous waste a year.145
An environmental impact assessment was conducted and revealed
that the plant "[laid] atop an ecological sensitive underground alluvial
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Mexico: Metalclad Sues Mexico under NAFTA, 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP.
288 (1997).
141. Id.
142. David R. Adair, Comment, Investors Rights: The Evolutionary Process of Investment
Treaties, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 195, 207 (1999) (citing Mark Thompson, O.C. Firm
Applies for Investment Protection, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 29, 1998, at Al). Metalclad operates
facilities in eight Mexican states. Metalclad waited to file its NAFTA dispute until the last
day of a three-year statute of limitations that would have barred some of the company's
claims. Company officials met with Mexican trade officials, ambassadors, and cabinet
ministers, trying every political and diplomatic avenue possible. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Mexico: Metalclad Sues Mexico under NAFTA, supra note 140.
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stream. ,14' From that assessment, the governor declared the site part of a
600,000-acre ecological zone and refused to allow Metalclad to reopen the
facility.1 4 1 Metalclad alleged that this action "effectively expropriated its
future expected profits and seeks $90 million in damages."'4 Metalclad
alleged that this taking of the company's property, commonly known as
environmental zoning, under the property rights provided by NAFTA
requires that the "offending government compensate the company. ' "9
Without NAFTA's forceful provision on expropriation, Metalclad by
itself would be compelled to assume the risks of investment. Metalclad
learned a valuable lesson for all investors: conduct proper environmental
assessments before committing significant capital to an investment ° This
case is demonstrative of how "certain non-market related risks of
investment could be shifted from companies to governments. 15.
There are other questions raised by this case. Metalclad alleged "the
Mexican Federal government is (unofficially) encouraging the company's
NAFTA lawsuit so that it can deflect the political fall-out of forcing the
state to open the facility.' ', 2 The local community was "never consulted
about the possibility of reopening the facility by either the federal or state
governments or Metalclad, and vehemently opposes locating a toxic dump
in its area."', 53 The local community is still suffering from the water
contamination exuded by the previous owners who indulged in illegal
storage procedures. 54
The case raises yet another troublesome possibility. 5  "If Metalclad's
claim that the Mexican federal government supports the suit is indeed
accurate, this case raises the disturbing possibility that investors can use
their rights to collude with governments to force unwanted, or even
dangerous investments on unwilling populations.',1
6
On August 30, 2000, the Arbitral Panel found "Mexico must be held
to have taken a measure tantamount to expropriation in violation of
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NAFTA Article 1110(1)."'¢ 5 As a result of this finding, Metalclad was
awarded $16,685,000.00 in damages. The result in this case helps to
establish the scope and power of expropriation provision.)59
B. Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada
Ethyl Corporation (Ethyl) of Richmond, Virginia brought a lawsuit
against the Government of Canada in April of 1997.'60 The Canadian
Parliament decided to place the interests of its citizens before Ethyl's right
to sell products in Canada through NAFTA. 61 Unable to ban the use of
the well-known and dangerous gasoline additive MMT under the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, the Parliament banned the import and
interprovincial transport of MMT produced by Ethyl. Ethyl retaliated by
bringing this lawsuit against the Government of Canada under the
NAFTA Chapter 11 expropriation provision.163 Ethyl sought restitution of
$251 million and alleged that the ban on importing MMT into Canada was
expropriation of its MMT production plant and excellent reputation.1
MMT, produced only by Ethyl, has usually been known as a
dangerous and toxic product.'65 It is a toxic manganese-based compound
that is added to gasoline to strengthen octane and lower engine
knocking. 6 Legislators in Canada were concerned that the MMT
emissions created a consequential public health risk. 67 "Automobile
manufacturers have long argued that MMT damages emissions diagnostics
and control equipment in cars," therefore increasing general emissions.)
The use of MMT is tracked by the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF),
and the EDF indicated that MMT is only used in Canada. 69 The U.S.
157. Metalclad v. United Mexican States, ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30, 2000), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm.
158. Id.
159. Our Future Under the Multilateral Agreement, supra note 137.
160. Adair, supra note 142, at 208.
161. Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, Ethyl Corporation vs. Government of Canada:
Now Investors Can Use NAFTA to Challenge Environmental Safeguards, at http://www.
citizen.orglpctrade/harmonizationalert/NAFTA/ethyl.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2000)
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Environmental Protection Agency has banned the use of MMT in
reformulated gasoline in the United States.70 Reformulated gasoline
makes up around one third of the U.S. gasoline market. 7' However, it
should be noted, the State of California has implemented a total ban on
MMT.1
7 2
Known as the third and largest lawsuit brought under Chapter 11, this
suit settled recently when Canada agreed to pay Ethyl $13 million and
repeal its ban on MMT' 73 This settlement creates a plethora of issues that
should concern policy-makers.7 4 Most importantly, this is the latest
indication that "international investment and trade agreements are leading
to the elimination of important environmental, consumer, health and
human rights laws.,
175
First, this case seems to indicate that a government must compensate
investors when it wants "to regulate them or their products for public
health or environmental reasons. 17 6 "Under NAFTA, the presumed 'right'
of corporations to be compensated when public health regulations affect a
company's bottom line is treated as the moral equivalent of the public's
right not to be harmed by industrial toxins., 177 This case could be
construed by investors to mean that demanding compensation from host
governments for the burdens of complying with the government's
environmental concerns creates a competent and fruitful business
178
strategy 7. For this reason, "the effect on environmental regulation could
be chilling."17 9
Second, the result of this case could increase the number of frivolous
lawsuits brought against host governments ° Usually, governments are the
only entities to have "standing to bring a case against a regulation" under
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pressure placed on governments helps to ensure a lack of frivolous
lawsuits." 2 However, Chapter 11 provides the investor with the ability to
bring the suit himself, and the settlement value of this case could persuade
the previously weary investor to file suit.1
81
In considering new regulations, lawmakers may now be intimidated by
private investors with the threat of a lawsuiti9 In this case, Ethyl filed suit
six months prior to the passing of the MMT ban by the Canadian
legislature.18' Ethyl's purpose was to threaten the lawmakers with a
multimillion-dollar suit in hope that it would deter them from passing the
MMT ban.' 6 Obviously, Ethyl was unsuccessful in its threat. 1 7 In the
future, investors now armed with the ability to file suit against a host
government may very well be successful with their threats.' This could
have tantamount ramifications, as the legislative process as a whole could
be considerably undermined.'89
Corporations can seek an unlimited amount of damages under
Chapter 11.10 Corporations may request damages for actual and future
earnings as well as compensation to repair its loss of goodwill."'
Consequently, there is a possibility that these suits could drain state
treasuries.'9 2 The $251 million that Ethyl sought and the $13 million that it
settled for could be the genesis of investor complaints seeking
astronomical figures in compensation. 93 Moreover, any number of
corporations have the ability to consolidate their suits, which could have
the effect of multiplying a government's potential payout. 194
Several critics of NAFTA had voiced their concerns that the
agreement would hinder the ability of governments to legislate on
significant matters such as environmental protection and public health.'9 5
NAFTA supporters easily dismissed these concerns; however, the Ethyl
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case has proven that those concerns were legitimate. ' This is of particular
significance because Chapter 11 "could be used by more than 350 million
individuals and corporations" within the NAFTA countries.1 97
C. Azinian v. United Mexican States
In this case, Robert Azinian and others are citizens of the United
States and shareholders of Desechos Solidos De Naucalpan S.A. de C.V.
(Desona), a Mexican corporate entity.9 In 1992, at the invitation of
Azinian the Mayor of Naucalpan, Mexico and members of its City Council,
or "Ayuntamiento," visited Los Angeles to observe operations of Global
Waste Industries, Inc., controlled by Azinian. 99
The Mayor and the Ayuntamiento were looking for a solution to their
city's solid waste problem.2 '0 Naucalpan is a large and important suburb of
Mexico City. 2°' At the time, the waste collection of the city was in disarray
and much of the city's equipment was inadequate and obsolete.1 2 The city
of Naucalpan entered into a $20 million, fifteen-year concession contract
with Desona.0 3
Desona did not provide the five rear load vehicles as required by the
concession contract.20 In fact, of the seventy state-of-the-art vehicles
required by the contract only two front loaders were provided.20 ' The
206Ayuntamiento became concerned and canceled the contract . Azinian
brought suit under Chapter 11 "seeking recovery for the loss of the value
of the concession contract as an ongoing enterprise. 20 7 The total claim for
201damages was $19.2 million.
The arbitral panel found that Azinian and others "had presented
themselves as principals in Global Waste, with approximately forty years
of experience in the industry."' 09 Subsequently, it was revealed that Global
196. Id.
197. Id.
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Waste was incorporated in 1991 and filed for bankruptcy in 1992."' The
panel also found that Azinian did not have forty years of experience in the
waste management industry; rather, he had a long record of unsuccessful
commercial litigation."' Hence, the arbitral panel held that Azinian's claim
failed entirely.
2
The importance of this case does not lie within its substantive ruling.
Rather, contrary to the Ethyl decision comments, the case is a prime
example that claimants will not be able to threaten and use Chapter 11 as a
sword.2" This decision indicates to host governments that a threat of a law
suit under Chapter 11, much like any other lawsuit, requires some
legitimate claim to effectuate settlement]' 4 Although Chapter 11 gives the
individual investor the power to sue the host government, it also provides
the host government a shield to protect itself from frivolous suits.
215
D. Lowen Group v. United States
In 1995, Jeremiah O'Keefe a Biloxi, Mississippi businessman, brought
suit against The Lowen Group, Inc. (Lowen)."' The suit alleges that
Lowen, a Canadian corporation, was strategizing to control the local
funeral market and that the group committed various other predatory and
anti-competitive acts "designed to drive O'Keefe's local funeral and
insurance companies out of business., 217 O'Keefe alleged that Lowen
refused to honor a contract that gave O'Keefe exclusive rights to funeral
218
and insurance services in the area.
A Mississippi jury assessed compensatory damages of $100 million
and punitive damages of $400 million against Lowen."1 Mississippi state
law requires that a losing defendant, who wishes to appeal without
beginning to pay damages, post a bond worth 125% of the damages
owed.220 The case was eventually settled for $150 million.2
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From this case, Lowen derived a Chapter 11 cause of action against
the United States.2z Lowen claimed that the Mississippi bond requirement
of 125% of the damages assessed expropriated its assets without providing
compensation.2 " Further, it argued that "the Mississippi Supreme Court
denied it justice in violation of NAFTA by not exempting it from the state
law bond requirement., 24 "Lowen is in effect arguing that the very civil
justice system allowing jury trials violated the company's NAFTA-
guaranteed rights to fair and equal treatment and non-discrimination.,, 215 It
is seeking compensation from the U.S. government in taxpayer dollars for
the settlement value of the O'Keefe case, $150 million, and the later
plunge in the value of the its stock, which it claims was a direct result of the
221lawsuit.
The consequences of Lowen's NAFTA lawsuit could be severe. The
121lawsuit threatens the core of our nation's civil justice system. If Lowen is
successful, legal precedent would be created that would allow other
corporations to exploit it and escape liability for its wrongful acts. 221 If
successful, the floodgates would open to allow any type of civil action or
court rule, on a foreign NAFTA corporation to be challenged as illegal
under NAFTA." 9 Jury verdicts, especially for products liability, could
readily be overturned.
Punitive damages could disappear if Lowen's attack on them is
successful under NAFTA.2 1' For many years, corporations have tried to no
avail to lobby Congress to cap or eliminate punitive damages."' If punitive
damages disappear as a result of being deemed illegal under NAFTA,S 233
once again the legislative process would be undermined. Even more
important, "U.S. taxpayers not corporate defendants could end up footing
the bill when a corporation is found liable by a jury for injury to others,
221. Id.
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wiping out both the concept of fairness and the deterrent effect of our
liability system.
' '134
Many U.S. corporations, however, have already done something very
similar against the governments of Canada and Mexico."' The U.S.
corporations have successfully challenged environmental and public
health regulations in Canada and Mexico.2 6 With the United States
involved in talks to expand NAFTA to the entire Western Hemisphere,
the pool of investors and corporations which could sue the United States is
immeasurable.7
E. S.D. Myers Case
Similar to the Ethyl case, in July of 1998, another U.S. corporation
filed suit against the Canadian government under Chapter 11.238 "S.D.
Myers, an Ohio company specializing in the cleaning of hazardous waste,"
brought an action against the Canadian government for the ban of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), an extremely hazardous coolant used in
electricity transformers.2 39 The Canadian government had banned the
241export of PCBs for a period of fifteen months in 1995. S.D. Myers alleges
that this ban cost the company $15 million and was an expropriation of its
241business.
The Canadian government had concerns that the PCBs might not be
properly disposed of in the United States and might return to contaminate
the Canadian environment.142 The Canadian government alleges that the
ban was instituted to comply with the international obligations under the
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.243 After fifteen months, the ban was
234. Canadian Corporation Found Liable, supra note 216.
235. Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, The Importance and Implication of Lowen's
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finally rescinded. 2" However, the ban was only rescinded for treatment
and destruction of hazardous waste and did not include landfills. 45
Therefore, S.D. Myers alleged that during those fifteen months, the ban
had prevented the company from completing its existing contracts that
246involved the exportation of PCBs. S.D. Myers is praying for $6.3 million
in damages. 7
Similar to the Ethyl case, the S.D. Myers case has environmentalists
worried about the safety of the environment and the health of the
•• 248
citizens. If S.D. Myers is able to recover or settle like Ethyl, there is a
sincere threat that governments will no longer ban toxic substances.249 It
seems clear that if governments are subject to multi-million dollar lawsuits
for banning toxic substances, they will no longer be able to afford the
luxury of protecting their environment and citizens with environmental
protection laws.250 The question then becomes where to draw the line.
Many will argue that Chapter 11 gives investors and companies a power
that will inevitably be detrimental to citizens and the environment.25 '
Conversely, investors must have the ability to hold host governments
252accountable for their actions. It appears that there might be a way to
compromise.253 It might be possible to restrict the ability to file a law suit,
and perhaps hold out certain environmental issues that would not include
254the power to sue.
V. RESULTS
In essence, the question to be resolved by most of the cases brought
under NAFTA Chapter 11 thus far is: When is regulation really
expropriation?255 It is readily apparent that the current NAFTA provision
defining investment, Article 1139, is extremely broad. 6 In that provision,
"investment" is a term that encompasses several different property
244. Id.
245. Id.
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interests including equity and debt securities, real estate, interests from
257
commitment of capital and various contracts.
It has been argued that the scope of Article 1139 could be limited to
provide a better definition of what is really protected from expropriation
with compensation. 21' Further, it has been argued that compensation
should only be awarded in cases where the property value is totally
destroyed or almost totally destroyed . Conversely, the broad language of
Article 1139 mitigates these arguments. Thus, if the drafters did not want
to include such a broad provision in NAFTA, they would not have
included such a broad array of property interests protected from
expropriation with the ability to seek compensation if expropriated.
"Moreover, [Article 1139] is unlikely to be read narrowly given that
international law has traditionally recognized that expropriation
compensation claims may be made in respect of a wide range of property
interests.,260
One of the stronger arguments in limiting the expropriation provision
includes dividing or redefining property rights.:61 The nature of the
argument is to isolate the property interests that are more likely to be
affected by regulation and only allow those certain interests the ability to
262 263
seek compensation. Nevertheless, this argument also has its opposition. 6
Defining which property interests are more likely to be affected by a
regulation could be a magnanimous task.264 Although ascertaining which
large groups of property interests might be affected by a government
regulation would be uncomplicated, it is the smaller groups of property
interests, which are intertwined or ancillary to the larger interest that will
create a laborious task: It has been said however, that "[aln astute
producer, anticipating the possibility of regulation of its products, might





For many years it has been recognized by legal scholars and
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267
economic injury caused by a legitimate state regulation. It is unfortunate
that the description of economic injury and legitimate state regulation is
268
extremely vague. Only regulations regarding public health, safety, and
the environment have been recognized as regulations which may be
regarded as non-compensable takings. 29
In contravention to this long-recognized police power of the
governments, "at least one review of international tribunal decisions has
concluded that the public purpose of the measure is not by itself sufficient
to establish the exercise of a police power., 270 The language in Article 1110
is analogous to this perception."' Therefore, the conclusion appears to be
that "since deference can be expected from international tribunals in the
face of a state's assertion of a public purpose, the key to understanding the
police power exception to international compensation rules lies in the
distinction between bona fide regulation and compensable measures.,
272
In deciding expropriation claims, current arbitration tribunals have
relied on judicial and arbitral precedent.2 However, the term
"expropriation" per se has rarely been defined by international
274jurisprudence. It seems that international arbitration panels and scholars
are far more concerned with developing the rules that govern
expropriation rather than defining the term itself.2 5 In almost all
international cases regarding whether or not an expropriation has
occurred, it was decided that an expropriation occurred. 27 6 "Indeed, as late
as 1986, a careful reviewer of international tribunal decisions, international
investment treaties, and state practice concluded that the boundary line
between regulation and expropriation remained essentially undefined in
international law.
277
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) is the leading
• . 278
source of decisions on international law of expropriation. The Tribunal279
holds the most extensive set of state arbitrations ever undertaken. When
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the Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979, there were thousands of claims
made by Iranian property owners in the United States and American
property owners in Iran.28 "The Tribunal has rendered approximately fifty
awards addressing claims for the taking of property arising out of those
events. ,281
Analogous to Chapter 11, the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal
contains language that is extremely broad.28 ' The Tribunal calls for
authority to resolve disputes that arise out of expropriations and other
measures affecting property rights." 283 This is similar language to NAFTA
Article 1110, which includes "measures tantamount," arguably even
broader than the Tribunal's language.24 "Moreover, as one member of the
Tribunal has noted, the breadth of its jurisdiction may have led to a certain
degree of laxity on the part of the Tribunal in maintaining definitional
distinctions between terms such as 'expropriation,' 'appropriation,'




The Tribunal, no matter how broad its language, still provides several
useful points of reference."' The cases in which the Tribunal has decided
what expropriation means have established a ceiling for the expropriation
definition. 2"7 As a result, the Tribunal has been hesitant to distinguish
between expropriation and other measures affecting property rights.
2 8
Further, when the Tribunal makes a decision that a certain regulation does
not give rise to compensation, it can be taken as a reliable indicator that
the same regulation should not give rise to compensation under NAFTA
Chapter 11.289
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment on Chapter 11 provides the individual foreign investor
with insight into its provisions, as well as the relatively few cases that have
been brought under this investment section of NAFTA. Investors should
now be well aware of the ICSID and its basic functions. Investors, as well
280. Id.
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as citizens of NAFTA countries, could be affected by the expropriation
provision of NAFTA. Finally, it is apparent that this provision may be too
broad and needs to be addressed because the environmental and public
health ramifications could be tantamount.
A. Chapter 11 Provisions
1. Section A
Section A of NAFTA Chapter 11 provides the definition of investor
and investment.2'9 It is obvious that the terms are defined very broadly to
include an overabundance of property interests.29' Section A provides for
nondiscriminatory treatment, performance requirements, managerial
regulation, transfers, expropriation and compensation, denial of benefits
and environmental protections. 92
Non-discriminatory treatment means that NAFTA governments are
required to treat investors and their investments no less favorably than
their own domestic investors or investments.2 9' A host government may not
impose equity requirements of a foreign investor or require that investor
to sell his investment."
A host government may not impose any performance requirements
on international investors.29' They may neither require a firm to export a
certain percentage of output nor may they require a firm to achieve a
certain trade balance. 96 The implementation of performance requirements
causes trade distortions to be eliminated, and host countries are further
prevented from placing performance requirements on their own
investors. 9
A host government may not require senior management positions of a
foreign NAFTA firm to be filled with local nationals.:" However, the host
government may force firms to have a majority of the board of directors
filled by local nationals: 99 Although this provision was intended to prevent
local persuasion, it is evident that having the board of directors filled with
local nationals hinders its purpose.
290. Price, supra note 2, at 728.
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Each NAFTA government must permit monetary transfers relating to
an investment to be made freely and without delay.i°n A government,
however, may prevent a transfer of funds if the firm is in bankruptcy or has
committed any criminal offenses. °1 Thus, the blocking of a transfer must
be made in a good faith application of the government's laws.02
Arguably, the most important provision so far is the expropriation
and compensation provision. A NAFTA government may not expropriate
any investment made by an investor of another NAFTA country other
than for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, and in accordance
with due process of law.:O3 Should a government expropriate a NAFTA
investor's investment, it is required to pay compensation without delay
equal to the fair market value of the investment.0 4 As noted earlier, this
provision has been the subject of a majority of the few cases brought under
NAFTA Chapter 11. The expropriation provision is overly broad and is
subject to abuse by NAFTA investors. Consequently, this abuse could
cause detrimental effects to the environment or public health.
A government may deny the benefits of Chapter 11.305 A government
may deny benefits if the government is currently applying economic
sanctions to the home country of the investor or if the investor has no
substantial business activity in the NAFTA country where they are
30. 307
established. 0' This provision is mainly directed at shell companies.
However, even a shell company may be provided benefits if it is the
company's principal place of business.308
Finally, Section A does provide host governments someS 309
environmental protections. It provides that Chapter 11 should not be
construed to prevent a party from adopting regulations to make sure
investments are undertaken in an environmentally sensitive manner.30
However, this protection has not been universally enforced. As seen in the
Ethyl case, investors are able to escape this provision by claiming
expropriation regardless of the environmental issues. Therefore, this
300. Id.
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provision, at least so far, has not been used to defend an expropriation suit
over environmental regulations.
2. Section B
All of the rules of settlement dispute resolution are set out in Section
B. 311 This section provides a mechanism to settle investment disputes that
assures equal treatment and due process before an impartial tribunal.312
Section B describes the statute of limitations, the types of claims allowed
to be submitted to arbitration, and the arbitration process. 3 '3All investment
314disputes, if not negotiated, will be settled before the ICSID .
a. The ICSID
The ICSID provides facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of
disputes between member countries and investors who qualify as nationals
of other member countries.31 ICSID conciliation and arbitration is entirely
voluntary, but once parties have agreed to arbitrate, neither party may
withdraw its consent."6 Also, all countries that are members of the ICSID,
whether or not they are parties to the dispute, must recognize the
arbitration award."' The ICSID also provides Additional Facility Rules,
which enables the ICSID to provide a venue for arbitration or conciliation
where either the state party or home state of the foreign national is not a
member of the ICSID.3 8 A final activity the ICSID performs is the ad hoc
arbitration. This usually surfaces in the performance of arbitration
proceedings under UNCITRAL 1 9
b. Cases
Most of the cases discussed throughout this comment have dealt with
the issue of whether or not host government promulgation of
environmental regulations is expropriation. The most noteworthy seem to
be the Ethyl and Metalclad cases. Although the Ethyl case settled, the
Canadian government ended up paying a high price for the suit.320 Canada
relinquished a ban on MMT, which they believed was dangerous to its
311. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1115.
312. Id.
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environment and public health, and paid $13 million to settle.321 Moreover,
Metalclad, provides clear precedent for exactly what the expropriation
provision means for governments and investors.
c. Results
The expropriation provision of NAFTA has several fallacies. The
provision is too broad and investors have already begun to exploit its
breadth. This expropriation provision needs to be narrowed so the
environmental protection and public health of any country is never
compromised. Moreover, the United States, Mexico, and Canada should
create an ad hoc committee to review the expropriation provision of
Chapter 11. The purpose of this committee should be to create ideas for
narrowing this provision so that all countries maintain the ability to protect
its public health and environment as it deems necessary. However, it seems
that this will not happen until one country, likely the United States, suffers
serious financial discomfort from defending and/or losing a Chapter 11
expropriation lawsuit.
321. Id.
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